Monday, February 27, 2012

events: corona impeachment


art. VII of the impeachment charge questions the manner in which a TRO was issued in favor of the former president GMA.

i find the following excerpt on the rule of law elucidating with regard to its due execution:
      " My second sub-rule is that questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion. Most modern commentators would not share to the full Dicey’s hostility to the exercise of official discretions. In the immigration field, for example, judges have routinely and gratefully invited the Secretary of State to exercise his discretion to grant leave to enter or remain to applicants who do not meet the tests for entry laid down in the immigration rules but whose personal history or circumstances demand  sympathetic consideration. But the essential truth of Dicey’s insight stands. The broader and more looselytextured a discretion is, whether conferred on an official or a judge, the greater the scope for subjectivity and hence for arbitrariness, which is the antithesis of the rule of law.25 This sub-rule requires that a discretion should ordinarily be narrowly defined and its exercise capable of reasoned justification. These are requirements which our law, in my opinion, almost always satisfies, because discretion imports a choice between two possible decisions and orders, and usually the scope for choice is very restricted. The grant of a civil injunction, it is always said, is discretionary. But if a clear violation of legal right is shown, and there is a clear risk of repetition injurious to the victim for which damages will not compensate, and there is no undertaking by the lawbreaker to desist, the trial judge ordinarily has no choice. His discretion can only, usually, be exercised one way. A second, very familiar, example is found in section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which provides:

      “In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.”

The use of the word “may” is relied on as conferring a discretion. But what the subsection does, I suggest, is to require an exercise of judgment, which may be difficult to make but which will determine the outcome: if the statutory condition is judged to be satisfied, the judge must refuse to allow the evidence to be given; if it is not, the subsection does not authorise the judge to exclude the evidence. For my third illustrative example I return to the immigration field. If an official were to grant leave to enter or remain to a person who did not meet the tests laid down in the immigration rules, but whose case presented no exceptional features whatever suggesting the need for special treatment, such decision would be incapable of rational justification and could not be defended as an exercise of discretion. There is in truth no such thing as an unfettered discretion, judicial or official, and that is what the rule of law requires."

granting that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements...primordial executive concerns through the Department of Justice should not have been easily dismissed. After all, situational realities, real dangers, possible adverse results are things which are well within the executive branch's' domain of certainty-determination.  not the courts' which by nature is insulated from the ever changing  realities of day to day-realities which are deemed- from moment to moment- uncertain.

      lord bingham on the rule of law