events: corona defense-a legal technique

the defense of the CJ is a form of legal technique-a trap in order to drag the IC in a situation where there would be a 'question of law' , hence beyond the jurisdiction of the IC since the SC has exclusive  jurisdiction on questions of law.

the IC must stir clear of this obstacle on the FCDA since it is actually irrelevant. the CJ himself said it: " wala pa akong nakitang jurisprudence regarding the alleged conflict".  all it has to do is stick to its guns on the SALN law.

it is actually that simple. the CJ has the prerogative ex oficio with regard to the implementation of the SALN. it is his duty and responsibility to see to it that this is implemented in the judiciary branch. if he had questions regarding its implementation, he should have coordinated with the CSC but that was not to be. there is an existing administrative resolution to hide the SALN's of the justices from the general public.

being the highest administrative officer of his branch, he constituted the appeal board for all discrepancies in the SALN's implementation and regulation. he however, chose not to. this is pure and simple misdemeanor. the failure to perform a duty.

every person who files a SALN knows its requirements. one must declare all forms of financial interests.

the  none observance or application of a law does not repeal it. neither does it mean that there is no law. once it is applied, you cannot question its validity.

you might say that there is no such thing as misdemeanor in the philippine constitution.


misdemeanor is the root word for impeachable offenses together with high crimes, originally provided for under the british parliamentary provision. it understandably circumscribes 'mal-administration' but does not include malfeasance, misfeasance, nor nonfeasance which are crimes specifically defined under the revised penal code.

from misdemeanor sprung what we term as 'betrayal of public trust' and 'culpable violation of the constitution' which are acts not in the category of 'high crimes'. here, there is some truth to the saying that "impeachable crimes are what the 'legislature' says they are", limited only by public policy.

and what is 'high crime'? they are those crimes which are punishable under our penal codes and special laws. the term 'high' being a derivative of the nature of the person's or officer's public office.

conclusion


i therefore hold that it is an error to use 'ejusdem generis' in determining the impeach-ability of an offense.

you only use ejusdem generis in singular classifications. for example, in 'high crimes', defining all crimes. or in 'misdemeanor' alone defining all forms of misdemeanors.

that is the reason why its usage in 'high crime and misdemeanors' becomes a conjuration of something 'fowl' and 'twisted' because they are two independent concepts.

events: observations on the corona defense

these are some of the observations noted with regard to the conduct of the accused chief justice's defense at the resumption of the proceeding from the five day break in order to give time for the defense to prepare for its deliberations:

1. as an initial salvo, the defense lead cuevas employs evasive tactics by questioning the manner in which the impeachment court (IC) proceeded to trial from the articles of impeachment by the lower house. attacking in effect the IC and threatening to go to the SC on grounds of grave abuse of discretion.

citing francisco v. house of representative cuevas expressed the option as a relief from the situation. enrile however, stated that the case does not fall on all fours since it never reached the senate.

bernas had a more fitting metaphorical description of it. he said it was "like beating a dead horse". hmmm...a dead horse in the legal battleground! 

 2. defense through counsel manalo and rep.tiangco expounds on the internal working of the House of Representatives (HR) postulating that the impeachment on corona was politically motivated. this is glaringly unfair considering the judicial privilege invoked by the SC in its feb.14 Valentine Resolution where they even prohibited any employee of the judiciary to testify without an approval from the court 'en banc'.

the IC however chose to be liberal on the matter enforcing the rule on admission of evidence that their consideration for relevance be left to the IC within its internal deliberations.



related readings:
g.r. no. 160261-separate opinion by corona
g.r. no. 160261-separate opinion by tinga

events: corona impeachment

 (DRAFT)

art. VII of the impeachment charge questions the manner in which a TRO was issued in favor of the former president GMA.


i find the following excerpt on the rule of law elucidating with regard to its due execution:

      " My second sub-rule is that questions of legal right and liability should ordinarily be resolved by application of the law and not the exercise of discretion. Most modern commentators would not share to the full Dicey’s hostility to the exercise of official discretions. In the immigration field, for example, judges have routinely and gratefully invited the Secretary of State to exercise his discretion to grant leave to enter or remain to applicants who do not meet the tests for entry laid down in the immigration rules but whose personal history or circumstances demand  sympathetic consideration. But the essential truth of Dicey’s insight stands. The broader and more looselytextured a discretion is, whether conferred on an official or a judge, the greater the scope for subjectivity and hence for arbitrariness, which is the antithesis of the rule of law.25 This sub-rule requires that a discretion should ordinarily be narrowly defined and its exercise capable of reasoned justification. These are requirements which our law, in my opinion, almost always satisfies, because discretion imports a choice between two possible decisions and orders, and usually the scope for choice is very restricted. The grant of a civil injunction, it is always said, is discretionary. But if a clear violation of legal right is shown, and there is a clear risk of repetition injurious to the victim for which damages will not compensate, and there is no undertaking by the lawbreaker to desist, the trial judge ordinarily has no choice. His discretion can only, usually, be exercised one way. A second, very familiar, example is found in section 78(1) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, which provides:


      “In any proceedings the court may refuse to allow evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it appears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.”


The use of the word “may” is relied on as conferring a discretion. But what the subsection does, I suggest, is to require an exercise of judgment, which may be difficult to make but which will determine the outcome: if the statutory condition is judged to be satisfied, the judge must refuse to allow the evidence to be given; if it is not, the subsection does not authorise the judge to exclude the evidence. For my third illustrative example I return to the immigration field. If an official were to grant leave to enter or remain to a person who did not meet the tests laid down in the immigration rules, but whose case presented no exceptional features whatever suggesting the need for special treatment, such decision would be incapable of rational justification and could not be defended as an exercise of discretion. There is in truth no such thing as an unfettered discretion, judicial or official, and that is what the rule of law requires."

granting that there was sufficient compliance with the requirements...primordial executive concerns through the Department of Justice should not have been easily dismissed. After all, situational realities, real dangers, possible adverse results are things which are well within the executive branch's' domain of certainty-determination.  not the courts' which by nature is insulated from the ever changing  realities of day to day-realities which are deemed- from moment to moment- uncertain.




reference:
      lord bingham on the rule of law